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INTRODUCTION 
 The point is technology matters.  
 . . .  
 . . . [T]he exposure of confidential and personal information [effected by a 
laptop or cell phone forensic search at the border] has permanence. It cannot 
be undone. Accordingly, the uniquely sensitive nature of data on electronic 
devices carries with it a significant expectation of privacy and thus renders an 
exhaustive exploratory search more intrusive than with other forms of 
property.  
 [In this case, a]fter their initial search at the border, customs agents made 
copies of the hard drives and performed forensic evaluations of the computers 
that took days to turn up contraband. It was essentially a computer strip 
search.1
 
In United States v. Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit issued a landmark 
ruling, holding that border agents must have reasonable suspicion before 
executing a forensic search of electronic devices seized from individuals 
crossing the border.2 Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is the 
exception, not the rule. The vast majority of cases require virtually no 
suspicion before border agents can search laptops or other electronic 
devices. Given that individuals now store highly personal information on 
these devices, the threat to privacy is substantial. 
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1
  United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 899 (2014). See generally Recent Cases, Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment—Ninth Circuit 
Holds Forensic Search of Laptop Seized at Border Requires Showing of Reasonable Suspicion.—United 
States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), 127 HARV. L. REV. 1041 (2014). 
2
  Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 962–68. 
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Technology has outpaced the law, and the United States Supreme 
Court needs to do something about it—now. Every day at the border, the 
privacy rights of individuals are being infringed, and the Fourth 
Amendment’s particularity requirement and the First Amendment’s free 
speech guarantee are being violated.3 Yet the justification for these 
infringements bears no relation to the outdated “border exception”4 or the 
government’s interest in security. Without even so much as a hunch, border 
security personnel can confiscate an individual’s laptop for days, force the 
owner to disclose its password, and conduct an unlimited search of (or even 
copy) the contents for later investigation. The Department of Homeland 
Security has not acknowledged that border security officials may search for 
contraband well beyond that which poses an immediate threat to border 
security. They can fish for evidence of any criminal activity—related or 
unrelated to border security—without a scintilla of suspicion that any crime 
has been committed.5 
This bears no relation to the reasons that initially justified a 
“Constitution-free” zone 100 miles inland from the border,6 such as locating 
dangerous weapons or illicit drugs, and it implicates some of our most 
cherished freedoms—privacy and free expression. These suspicionless 
searches violate the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness and particularity 
requirements and threaten to chill political speech that is neither criminal 
nor suspicious. A laptop is a virtual office with the capacity to store 
thousands of files, troves of entertainment, and scores of intimate photos. If 
border officials could look in any “room” they pleased, people might think 
twice before storing personal documents that would be embarrassing if 
viewed by an unknown border agent or, perhaps more concretely, storing a 
video critical of the President or of someone burning the American flag. 
The law is often unable to keep pace with the technological 
advancements law enforcement uses to conduct more intrusive and, often, 
suspicionless searches. The protection of an individual’s constitutional 
rights, particularly privacy, can no longer wait for lawsuits to meander their 
 
3
  See Susan Stellin, Border Agents’ Power to Search Devices is Facing Increasing Challenges in 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/business/ 
court-cases-challenge-border-searches-of-laptops-and-phones.html (“[A]bout 36,000 people are referred 
to secondary screening by United States Customs and Border Protection daily, and roughly a dozen of 
those travelers are subject to a search of their electronic devices.”). Between October 1, 2008 and June 
2, 2010, Customs and Border Protection border agents searched the electronic devices of 6671 travelers, 
nearly half of which were American citizens. Government Data Regarding Electronic Device Searches, 
ACLU (Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.aclu.org/national-security/government-data-regarding-electronic-
device-searches. 
4
  See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977). 
5
  See Editorial, Congress Must Act to End Electronic Fishing Expeditions at the Border, L.A. TIMES 
(Sept. 13, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/13/opinion/la-ed-laptops-20100913. 
6
  See Fact Sheet on U.S. “Constitution Free Zone,” ACLU (Oct. 22, 2008), 
https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/fact-sheet-us-constitution-free-zone. 
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way through the lengthy—and often costly—litigation process. Lest there 
be any doubt about the sweeping authority of border agents currently, 
decades ago, the Court upheld the constitutionality of suspicionless border 
searches based on doubts that “any other canvassing technique would 
achieve acceptable results,” and because there is a “relatively limited 
invasion of . . . privacy.”7 
But there is a fundamental difference between the physical and virtual 
worlds, between searches of containers and laptops, and between present 
and future threats. In Abidor v. Napolitano, the court failed to recognize this 
fact and instead applied an outdated solution to a new—and unforeseen—
problem.8 The Supreme Court must intervene, as it did recently in People v. 
Riley, and begin the process of restoring the balance between liberty and 
security. In Riley, the defendant was arrested after a traffic stop revealed a 
suspended license and two guns in the engine compartment.9 Without a 
warrant or probable cause, law enforcement searched the contents of the 
defendant’s cell phone and found various incriminating photographs and 
video clips that were later used at trial on different charges relating to a 
prior gunfight with rival gang members.10 The California Court of Appeals 
held that the officers’ conduct was justified by the inventory search 
doctrine,11 even though that doctrine is intended to protect the owner’s 
property, protect police from claims of stolen or lost property, or protect 
police from danger,12 none of which were served by searching the cell 
phone’s contents. The Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari may 
reflect a concern that law enforcement has gone too far and that privacy 
protections need to be strengthened in light of recent technological 
advances. We submit that they do. 
The solution, we argue, is that border agents ought not to be permitted 
to search digital devices absent at least reasonable suspicion.13 Since there 
 
7
  Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). 
8
  Abidor v. Napolitano, No. 10–CV–04059 (ERK)(JMA), 2013 WL 6912654, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 31, 2013) (comparing laptops to other “closed containers,” such as luggage, disposable cameras, 
and 3.5” floppy disks). We note that the storage capability of a typical laptop computer far exceeds that 
of luggage, a disposable film camera, or floppy disks. 
9
  People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *1–2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013) 
(unpublished table decision), cert. granted in part, 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014). 
10
  Id. at *3, *6. 
11
  Id. at *5–6. 
12
  South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976). 
13
  It should be noted that, although the court in Abidor did not rule on whether reasonable suspicion 
is necessary for a border search of digital devices, the court nonetheless found that even if reasonable 
suspicion were required, the agents had adequate reasonable suspicion to search Abidor’s digital 
equipment. 2013 WL 6912654, at *18–19. The court found adequate reasonable suspicion where Abidor 
(1) possessed computer images of designated terror groups, Hamas and Hezbollah, engaged in rallies, 
although Abidor explained to the agents that he was a Ph.D. student focused on the modern history of 
Shi’ites in Lebanon, and (2) possessed two passports, United States and French, although that, in itself, 
is, of course, legal. Id. 
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is, at present, a circuit split on the matter,14 the time is ripe for the Supreme 
Court to resolve the dispute, but it missed that opportunity when it denied 
certiorari in Cotterman in early 2014.15 Importantly, however, Abidor 
presents another opportunity. In Abidor, the Eastern District of New York 
recognized the majority rule that border agents need not have reasonable 
suspicion before conducting forensic searches of a laptop computer.16 
Abidor is significant because the court acknowledged in its holding that, “if 
suspicionless forensic computer searches at the border threaten to become 
the norm, then some threshold showing of reasonable suspicion should be 
required.”17 Nevertheless, the Court refused to impose this standard 
“because the extremely limited resources available to conduct 
comprehensive forensic searches necessarily limits such searches to 
situations where some level of suspicion is present.”18 We believe that 
courts should not wait until it has “become the norm,” particularly where, 
as the court acknowledged in Abidor, these searches intruded upon privacy 
rights.19 Instead, the courts should act before, not after, the harm is done. If 
they do not act, Congress should step in to enact legislation requiring 
reasonable suspicion for border searches of digital devices. The 
Constitution requires no less. 
I. THE TIDE IS BEGINNING TO SHIFT AMIDST A RECOGNITION THAT 
LAPTOP SEARCHES AT THE BORDER INFRINGE ON FOURTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS 
Laptops, like cell phones, are the modern repositories for the “papers” 
and “effects” traditionally protected by the Fourth Amendment.20 The 
information contained in a hard drive therefore carries with it a subjectively 
and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. 
In the technology era, these rights are under attack. As the recent 
National Security Agency (NSA) scandal demonstrates, the government has 
gone to substantial, and insufficiently checked, lengths to compromise 
private information. The pendulum, however, is beginning to swing back. 
As President Obama noted in his final press conference of 2013, “[I]n a 
virtual world, some of these boundaries don’t matter anymore. And just 
 
14
  Two circuits have held that border searches of digital devices require no showing of suspicion. 
United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 F. App’x 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Ickes, 393 
F.3d 501, 506–07 (4th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit has held reasonable suspicion is required. United 
States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 899 (2014). 
15
  Cotterman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 899 (2014). 
16
  Abidor, 2013 WL 6912654 at *18. 
17
  Id. 
18
  Id. 
19
  Id. at *16. 
20
  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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because we can do something doesn’t mean we necessarily should . . . .”21 
The President was reacting to the forty-six NSA surveillance reform 
recommendations his own five-expert panel had released just eight days 
before, on December 12, 2013.22 
Although the NSA programs at issue in the President’s press 
conference involved global and domestic telephone metadata collection, 
presumably for later investigation,23 it has relevance in the border search 
context. Pursuant to agency policies, border agents can seize and search the 
contents of the cell phones, laptops, and other digital devices as their 
possessors cross into the United States. Although some commentators and 
courts differentiate between so-called “quick look” and deeper “forensic” 
digital border searches, the authors maintain that both types violate the First 
and Fourth Amendments, therefore making it a distinction without a 
constitutional difference. To be sure, the issue is one of degree, not kind. 
While a quick look is obviously not as intrusive as a forensic search, it can 
nonetheless uncover highly personal information that an individual has a 
right to keep private. One commentator states: 
An officer searching a cell phone can at least initially do so fairly easily, by 
“just ‘thumbing through’ the cell phone.” As Professor Gershowitz has written, 
searches of pagers and early generation cell phones “do not require in-depth 
searching to obtain evidence. Police need to push only a limited number of 
buttons in order to reach pager numbers and only a few additional buttons to 
retrieve text messages.”24
 
Thus, both quick look and forensic searches “create ‘a serious and 
recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals.’”25 
 
21




  PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, 
LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD (2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf. 
23
  The NSA large-scale interception and storage of telephone metadata has been the subject of 
varied assessments in the federal district courts that have examined the programs to date. Compare 
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (enjoining the NSA from further metadata 
seizures, stayed pending appeal, and finding that the seizures were Fourth Amendment searches), with 
ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding NSA’s telephone metadata collection 
program constitutional). 
24
  Margaret M. Lawton, Warrantless Searches and Smartphones: Privacy in the Palm of Your 
Hand?, 16 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 89, 101 (2012) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ashley B. Snyder, Note, 
The Fourth Amendment and Warrantless Cell Phone Searches: When is Your Cell Phone Protected?, 
46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 155, 163 (2011); Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth 
Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 41 (2008)). 
25
  United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 
1720  (2009)). 
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A. The Facts in Abidor 
In Abidor, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York upheld the constitutionality of laptop border searches.26 Despite 
the First and Fourth Amendments, the court held that border agents need 
not meet any particular standard before they search any closed container 
(including laptops, cell phones, external hard drives, and similar digital 
devices).27 The court quoted Cotterman to acknowledge that an “exhaustive 
forensic search of a copied laptop hard drive intrudes upon privacy and 
dignity interests to a far greater degree than a cursory search at the 
border.”28 It also used Cotterman to diminish these interests, stating that 
“the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that its opinion would not have any 
practical effect . . . because the extremely limited resources available to 
conduct comprehensive forensic searches necessarily limits such searches to 
situations where some level of suspicion is present.”29 The Abidor court did 
recognize, however, that if these searches were to “become the norm,” 
reasonable suspicion would be required.30 In our view, the court erred by 
taking a wait-and-see approach, rather than saying now what courts will 
almost certainly say later: suspicionless searches are unconstitutional. To 
make matters worse, the court rested its decision on the long history of 
suspicionless border searches held to be constitutional as necessary to 
protect the sovereign from dangerous material entering its territory.31 As 
discussed below, these decisions do not justify the suspicionless search of a 
laptop. 
The Abidor case involved border agents that seized numerous digital 
devices from a graduate student crossing a United States border and 
searched the student’s cell phones for up to five hours but did not return the 
student’s laptop and external hard drive until eleven days later.32 In doing 
so, the agents followed, in broad brush, the guidelines of United States 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) promulgated in 200833 and 2009,34 as 
justified and explained in a 2011 Department of Homeland Security 
 
26
  Abidor v. Napolitano, No. 10–CV–04059 (ERK)(JMA), 2013 WL 6912654, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 31, 2013). 
27
  Id. 
28
  Id. at *17 (quoting United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 899 (2014)). 
29
  Id. at *18. 
30
  Id. 
31
  Id. at *14–17. 
32
  Id. at *5. 
33
  U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., POLICY REGARDING BORDER SEARCH OF INFORMATION. 
(2008), available at http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/search_authority_2.pdf. 
34
  Memorandum from U.S. Customs & Border Prot. outlining CBP Directive No. 3340–049 (Aug. 
20, 2009), available at http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/elec_mbsa_3.pdf. 
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report.35 The report states that “overall authority to conduct border searches 
without suspicion or warrant is clear and long-standing, and courts have not 
treated searches of electronic devices any differently than searches of other 
objects.”36 
Abidor’s complaint alleged that the agents searched numerous files on 
Abidor’s laptop that contained “highly private and expressive materials 
[revealing] intimate details” about the student’s life.37 The district court 
upheld this extended search of the student’s laptop and hard drive because 
(1) border searches have historically been granted considerable leeway for 
sovereign protection, and (2) cost and manpower concerns make it 
impossible for federal border agents to conduct suspicionless searches of all 
cellphones and laptops, so there was no need to set a specific standard, 
including that of reasonable suspicion, for agents to meet to justify such a 
search.38 Most importantly, the court’s decisions devalued Abidor’s privacy 
interest, even while recognizing later in its opinion that, should these 
searches become more widespread, they would require reasonable 
suspicion. For example, quoting Professor Wayne LaFave, the court stated 
that because “the individual crossing a border is on notice that certain types 
of searches are likely to be made, his privacy is less invaded by those 
searches.”39 As a result, “[t]he individual traveler determines the time and 
place of the search by his own actions, and he thus has ample opportunity to 
diminish the impact of that search by limiting the nature and character of 
the effects which he brings with him.”40 
In reaching its decision, the court cited many of the leading cases from 
the largely pre-digital age.41 After noting that the inquiry balances the 
government’s interest against the intrusion into the subject’s Fourth 
Amendment rights, the court found, “[t]he Government’s interest in 
preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the 
 
35
  U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CIVIL RIGHTS/CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPACT ASSESSMENT: BORDER 
SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES (2011), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/Redacted%20Report.pdf. Most of the report’s Fourth and First Amendment analysis was 
redacted upon publication. Id. at 10–18. 
36
  Id. at 15. 
37
  Abidor v. Napolitano, 2013 WL 6912654, at *6 (quoting Complaint at ¶ 51, Abidor, 2013 WL 
6912654 (No. 10–CV–04059 (ERK)(JMA))). 
38
  Id. at *14–16, *18–19. 
39
  Id. at *16 (quoting WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 10.5(a) (4th ed. 2011–12)). 
40
  Id. at *16 (alteration in original) (quoting LAFAVE, supra note 39, § 10.5(a)). 
41
  See id. at *15 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (“Travelers may be so 
stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably requiring 
one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in and his belongings as effects which 
may be lawfully brought in.”); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (discussing 
administrative searches generally, the Supreme Court held that “because the inspections are neither 
personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited 
invasion of . . . privacy”). 
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international border.”42 In Flores-Montano, border agents discovered illegal 
drugs after removing and disassembling the defendant’s gas tank.43 The 
Court’s decision was based on the long-standing recognition “that 
automobiles seeking entry into this country may be searched.”44 
Indeed, as the Court correctly held, “[i]t is difficult to imagine how the 
search of a gas tank, which should be solely a repository for fuel, could be 
more of an invasion of privacy than the search of the automobile’s 
passenger compartment.”45The same cannot be said for the search of a 
laptop, which, like modern-day cell phones, “can also contain address 
books, calendars, voice and text messages, email, video and pictures.”46 
Also, unlike a gas tank, the intrusion upon privacy in the context of laptop 
searches is far-reaching and potentially unlimited. 
The Abidor court declined to highlight these differences. While it 
briefly touched on the “significant invasion of privacy” occasioned by a 
forensic laptop search, the court suggested that “the sensible advice to all 
travelers is to ‘[t]hink twice about the information you carry on your 
laptop,’ and to ask themselves: ‘Is it really necessary to have so much 
information accessible to you on your computer?’”47 This advice just front-
loads each border-crosser’s loss of constitutional protection; rather than 
being subjected to a laptop search at the border, the court recommends that 
it is somehow preferable for the traveler’s speech to be chilled by leaving 
the laptop at home. Constitutional rights should not be so flimsy, 
particularly in the context of laptop border searches, where the traditional 
justifications for border searches—safety and discovery of contraband—do 
not apply. As discussed below, laptops cannot hide or be used as weapons, 
and they cannot store physical objects. 
Ironically, the Abidor court recognized this fact, by holding that, “if 
suspicionless forensic computer searches at the border threaten to become 
the norm, then some threshold showing of reasonable suspicion should be 
required.”48 The Fourth Amendment does not, however, require a set 
number of harms before it springs into action. One violation is too many. 
Constitutional rights are intended to chill the arbitrary exercise of 
government power, not the individual’s right to privacy—or free speech. 
 
42
  Abidor, 2013 WL 6912654, at *14 (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–
53 (2004)). 
43
  541 U.S. at 151. 
44
  Id. at 154. 
45
  Id. 
46
  United States v. Park, No. CR 05–375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007). 
47
  Abidor, 2013 WL 6912654, at *16 (quoting PONEMON INST. LLC, AIRPORT INSECURITY: THE 
CASE OF MISSING & LOST LAPTOPS 8 (2008), available at http://www.dell.com/downloads/global/ 
services/dell_lost_laptop_study.pdf. 
48
  Id. at *18. 
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As Abidor revealed, these threats are real. The other plaintiffs in 
Abidor were the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
(NACDL) and the National Press Photographers Association (NPPA). 
These associations argued that their members were likely to be adversely 
affected by suspicionless digital border searches. The NACDL, for 
example, “allege[d] that many of its members—criminal defense attorneys 
resident throughout the country—routinely travel abroad for professional 
purposes and bring with them electronic devices containing personal, 
confidential, or privileged information.”49 Thus, the suspicionless search of 
their laptops “interfere[s] with its members’ ability to represent clients 
because they must ‘take seriously the risk that the content of their electronic 
devices could be reviewed, copied, and detained.’”50 These allegations 
suggest that the Abidor court’s “sensible advice” to “[t]hink twice about the 
information you carry on your laptop,” is neither sensible nor realistic.51 
The pre-digital case law is inapplicable and harmful. 
B. Fourth Amendment Implications Highlighted By Abidor 
Unfortunately, Abidor is symptomatic of the difficulties courts face 
when trying to force-fit today’s digital age realities into old, longstanding, 
and virtually unchallenged doctrine from the pre-digital era. Those border 
search precedents permitted suspicionless searches to allow the border 
agents to search for and seize dangerous things, such as guns and illegal 
drugs. When the court in Abidor permitted the extended search of the 
student’s laptop and other digital equipment without setting a standard of 
reasonable suspicion, it expanded border agents’ authority to search for any 
evidence of current or potential criminal activity, even if expressed as an 
idea, belief, or opinion. For example, in Abidor the court noted that the 
border agents’ search of Abidor’s computer uncovered pictures of Hamas 
and Hezbollah, “both of which were designated by the State Department as 
terrorist organizations.”52 Absent any other indicator that Abidor actually 
had ties to these organizations, the obvious response to that statement 
should be: so what? 
To begin with, the mere possession of images depicting a terrorist 
organization, be it Hezbollah or Al Capone, is not unlawful. Additionally, 
the government treads on dangerous ground when it attempts to justify 
searches based on the mere possession—or presence—of material that does 
not reliably suggest criminal behavior. In other words, the same problems 
that racial or ethnic profiling cause also arise here, and the constitutional 
cost, including infringement on personal privacy and downright 
 
49
  Id. at *6. 
50
  Id. (quoting Complaint at ¶ 77, Abidor, 2013 WL 6912654 (No. 10–CV–04059 (ERK)(JMA))). 
51
  Id. at *16 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting PONEMON INST. LLC, supra 
note 47, at 8). 
52
  Id. at *5. 
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humiliation, is undeniable. They are problems of interpretation and 
inference, all of which risk the arbitrary exercise of power. For example, 
images of an anti-American rally, or a video documenting the bombing of 
Pan Am Flight 103, do not suggest criminal or even hostile behavior. These 
items may be part of a research project, a course assignment, or a curious 
mind. But if discovered during a laptop search at the border, law 
enforcement has the discretion to interpret them any way they want. And 
they use other factors, such as the individual’s race and ethnicity, to create 
suspicion and thereby justify a more extensive—and intrusive—search. 
Moreover, it makes little sense to argue that Abidor failed to offer a 
convincing explanation regarding the presence of these materials. He should 
not have to. The burden is on law enforcement, not individual citizens, to 
explain their reasons for conducting a search of protected information. 
Otherwise, it creates a situation where the victim of an invasive search is 
blamed for the failure to explain innocent conduct in a suspicionless 
context. Despite these realities, and the damage to Abidor’s privacy, the 
court failed to provide a remedy. 
The court’s decision highlighted another problem—applying old, pre-
digital age case law and theories to today’s digital technologies. These older 
cases are not only factually distinguishable but also rest on now-invalid 
assumptions. For example, unlike traditional closed containers, laptops 
cannot hold tangible objects, much less dangerous ones.53 Also, unlike gas 
tanks, passenger compartments, or suitcases, laptops cannot hide illegal 
drugs or other contraband. What they can hold, however, is limitless 
amounts of personal information that constitute the electronic version of the 
“papers” and “effects” that the Fourth Amendment protects.54 And people 
do, in fact, store this type of information on laptops (and other electronic 
devices).55 That is why the reasoning in pre-digital era case law cannot 
address this problem. Laptops are fundamentally different objects, as to 
both the contraband they cannot contain (dangerous weapons or illegal 
drugs), and the scope of information they can contain (private and 
confidential documents). 
Thus, the risk of relying on outdated case law is substantial. Travelers 
and organizations of all stripes are at risk of extensive border searches of 
their digital equipment if they travel internationally. Private emails to 
family members and loved ones may be searched. An individual’s 
Facebook page, Google search history, and record of recent purchases may 
 
53
  See, e.g., State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 2009) (distinguishing cell phones from 
closed containers, which “have traditionally been physical objects capable of holding other physical 
objects”). 
54
  See U.S. CONST., amend. IV. 
55
  See United States v. Park, No. CR 05–375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007) 
(emphasizing “the quantity and quality of information that can be stored on a cellular phone” as a basis 
for affording Fourth Amendment protection). 
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also be subject to examination. Additionally, defense counsels, for example, 
who bear the extreme burdens of privilege and confidentiality on behalf of 
their clients, cannot confidently carry their confidential material across a 
border for fear of interception and search. A reporter cannot really promise 
confidentiality to a source whose identity, when stored on a laptop or cell 
phone, can be seized without suspicion upon the reporter’s re-entry into the 
United States. This begs the question—what reason can the government 
offer to justify these searches? As Abidor demonstrates, the government has 
offered several, but none are convincing. 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF SUSPICIONLESS DIGITAL 
SEARCHES AT THE BORDER 
Abidor is not just about the Fourth Amendment. Intrusive searches of 
laptops at the border also threaten to chill constitutionally protected speech. 
If individuals know that their laptops can be subject to suspicionless 
searches, then they may hesitate before sending an email, downloading a 
video, or storing a confidential document. The chilling effect that will likely 
occur cannot be tolerated in a society that prides itself on a “marketplace of 
ideas.”56 
Indeed, using outdated case law also implicates First Amendment 
issues. The First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . . ”57 The Amendment’s 
protections have repeatedly extended to unpopular or offensive speech or 
other expressive conduct, including profane speech,58 Nazi speech,59 
obscenity consistent with community standards,60 and a substantial portion 
of what some would consider “hate” speech.61 Much of the contents of 
one’s laptop or cell phone might be offensive to a person or group, be 
considered profane or obscene to a degree, or give rise to a subjective belief 
that the mere possession of such material suggests criminal conduct. Some 
of the contents may be unpopular, “unpatriotic,” and even revolting, but 
they are protected, and not necessarily indicative of criminal intent. Of 
course, there will be some items, which are traditionally characterized as 
hate speech, that may suggest criminal activity and therefore justify a laptop 
 
56
  Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 851 (2008). 
57
  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
58
  See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
59
  See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
60
  See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
61
  See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). “[I]f there is any principle of the 
Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free 
thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.” United 
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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search.62 But the courts are not justifying these laptop border searches based 
on speech that is suggestive of criminal activity; they are relying on the 
rationale of pre-digital case law. As stated above, however, this rationale 
does not apply in the context of laptop searches. 
Ultimately, American citizens—and noncitizens—should not have to 
fear that they will arouse suspicion when crossing the border simply 
because their laptop contains a YouTube video depicting an anti-American 
rally. Indeed, permitting unlimited laptop searches at the border might 
result in a significant chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment 
rights. To be sure, a laptop is not similar to a briefcase, even though both 
can contain confidential documents. A laptop can store an infinitely larger 
amount of information, including electronic and social media, and 
numerous forums through which individuals communicate.63 Furthermore, 
unlike briefcases, laptops cannot store weapons. That is why suspicionless 
laptop border searches present a unique—and acute—threat to First 
Amendment freedoms. 
This possibility also demonstrates the inextricable link between 
privacy and expression. Though the infringement is not occasioned by 
disclosure itself, it arises from the resulting chill on political speech that 
makes people think twice before exercising their constitutional rights, or, as 
the Abidor court said, “[t]hink twice about the information [people] carry 
on [their] laptop.”64 In Abidor, the seized depictions were gatherings of 
terroristic groups—gatherings one can see depicted on television and 
Internet news programming, yet the government’s search of the laptop, and 
the court’s reliance on images of Hezbollah to support its decision, shows 
how far we have come from the days when physical safety and the presence 
of contraband, rather than protected speech, justified these suspicionless 
border searches. 
Searches like the ones in Abidor are tantamount to a search for 
unpopular ideas,65 and are conducted in a manner that is far more intrusive 
than the pre-digital creators of the border exception could have 
contemplated. The border agents are not searching for drugs or guns, or 
other implements that threaten safety. Instead, they are searching for 
evidence of lawful activities that might give rise to a suspicion that a further 
 
62
  See, e.g., Richard Delgado, What if Brown v. Board of Education was a Hate-Speech Case?, 
1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 271, 281 (2005) (internal footnotes omitted) (“Recent scholarship has cast doubt 
on the idea that hate speech is essentially innocuous. Books such as Alexander Tsesis’s Destructive 
Messages show how a climate of hate speech contributed to practically every mass hate movement in 
history.”). 
63
  See Jacqueline Kotyk, What Is a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Information Contained 
on a Workplace Computer?, 22 EDUC. & L.J. 223, 226 (2013). 
64
  Abidor v. Napolitano, No. 10–CV–04059 (ERK)(JMA), 2013 WL 6912654, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 31, 2013) (quoting PONEMON INST. LLC, supra note 47, at 8). 
65
  See generally Erick Lucadamo, Note, Reading Your Mind at the Border: Searching Memorialized 
Thoughts and Memories on Your Laptop and United States v. Arnold, 54 VILL. L. REV. 541 (2009). 
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and even more intrusive search is necessary. They are searching tax returns, 
personal correspondence, locational data, browsing history, photographs, 
and information that has been deleted, though retained in the deep recesses 
of the device. If the border exception currently makes it permissible for a 
border agent to retroactively manufacture reasonable suspicion only by first 
having unlimited authority to search these otherwise legally possessed types 
of documents and information, then we must seriously rethink the border 
exception. 
In the absence of some standard to first justify the search, such as 
reasonable suspicion, border agents are conducting nothing other than a 
digital dragnet. Furthermore, the traditional justifications underlying the 
border exemption—“national self-protection”66 and “unwanted . . . 
effects,”67—are outweighed by the substantial and enduring threats to 
privacy and speech. Also, the possibility of uncovering present criminal 
activity, e.g., images of child pornography, does not justify intrusions that 
are based on no suspicion whatsoever. Instead of requiring suspicion to 
precede the search, border agents now have an unchecked power to search 
and thereby create suspicion. In many cases, such as Abidor, that suspicion 
or evidence of wrongdoing is at most suggestive of future criminal activity, 
and that suggestion is itself often based on unreliable assumptions. Videos 
of anti-American or anti-government demonstrators, for example, are 
suggestive only insofar as the border agent thinks they are. And that degree 
of subjectivity does not—and should not—permit either a quick look or 
forensic search of a laptop. 
III. A REASONABLE SUSPICION THRESHOLD STRIKES THE RIGHT 
BALANCE BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY 
Given the significant infringement on First and Fourth Amendment 
rights, the government’s interests in self-protection and protection of its 
residents neither justify nor require suspicionless border searches of digital 
devices. Rather, a reasonable suspicion threshold before permitting a border 
search of digital devices would adequately protect the sovereign. 
Reasonable suspicion is a threshold far lower than probable cause, but is 
vastly superior to no threshold at all. “A reasonable suspicion inquiry 
simply considers, after taking into account all the facts of a particular case, 
whether the border official ha[d] a reasonable basis on which to conduct the 
search.”68 Though this is a relatively modest threshold, it provides an extra 
layer of protection for travelers’ rights by banning digital dragnet searches 
 
66
 Abidor, 2013 WL 6912654, at *15 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)). 
67
  Id. at *14 (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004)). 
68
  Id. at *18 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 
2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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at our borders while at the same time protecting legitimate government 
interests. 
Of course, the alternative would be to require probable cause, which 
would afford those crossing the border the full protection of the Fourth 
Amendment. This could, however, hinder the government’s legitimate 
interest in interdicting criminal material in laptop memories from entering 
the country. If border agents, for example, had reasonable suspicion to 
believe that an individual possessed a computer file depicting a particular 
plan to attack the White House, but could not conduct a search absent 
additional proof, it would almost certainly guarantee that these criminal 
digital materials would, at some point, cross the border. In this way, a 
probable cause standard would undermine the initial justifications that gave 
rise to the border exception. A reasonable suspicion standard therefore 
strikes a better—and more constitutional—balance. 
Thus, if a person appears at the border intending to enter the United 
States and the border agent’s screen indicates the person has an ongoing 
pattern of prior convictions for child pornography, those convictions may, 
depending on circumstances such as the number, severity, and recentness of 
prior convictions, permit the border agents to search the person’s electronic 
devices.69 If a person seeks to enter the United States and border agents 
discover the person is on a terror watchlist, border agents might also, 
depending on the circumstances, have sufficient reasonable suspicion to 
search the person’s electronic devices. And where the agents know that an 
entering person was suspected of ongoing immigration fraud involving the 
creation of immigration documents on his computer, the agents would 
certainly have at least reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the agents’ 
search of the person’s computer equipment.70 
It is not enough, however, to say that the unchecked searches of 
laptops are acceptable because the border search exception is “as old as the 
Fourth Amendment itself.”71 Times change, and new circumstances can 
present threats to constitutional protections that did not exist or were not 
foreseen. That is precisely the case in the digital age. Border searches of 
digital devices are not searches for the particular types of illegal objects that 
 
69
  See, e.g., Irving, 452 F.3d 110 (ruling that border agents had reasonable suspicion to search 
computer diskettes in Irving’s luggage upon his arrival to the United States from Mexico after the agents 
were informed Irving had a prior conviction for attempted sexual abuse of a child, and was a target in a 
federal investigation into persons traveling to Mexico to engage in sexual acts with children); United 
States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (noting that upon Bunty’s return to the United 
States from London, border agents had reasonable suspicion to search the computer equipment in 
Bunty’s possession after the agents were informed he had a prior arrest for sexual abuse of a child and a 
prior guilty plea for corrupting morals of a minor). 
70
  See, e.g., United States v. Singh, 295 F. App’x 190 (9th Cir. 2008). 
71
  United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 505 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 
U.S. 606, 619 (1977)). 
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also are as old as the Fourth Amendment itself. Instead, they are searching 
for anything at all and that is the problem. 
But all is not lost. As the vignettes and actual cases above demonstrate, 
the sovereign can still protect its interests if it only meets the relatively 
meager reasonable suspicion threshold. This proposal does not leave 
sovereigns without border protections, and better honors the Fourth 
Amendment, the First Amendment, and the people. The proposal leaves in 
place the traditional border search exception for items other than the 
contents of digital devices. 
IV. IF COURTS CANNOT EFFECTIVELY SERVE AS ARBITERS OF 
PRIVACY’S CONTOURS IN THE DIGITAL AGE, CONGRESS MUST STEP INTO 
THAT BREACH 
The courts should strengthen privacy protections by providing a 
fairer—and more just—framework to govern border searches. But courts 
can only do so much. Legal doctrines such as standing, stare decisis 
principles, and the slow rate at which litigation progresses impose internal 
constraints on the Court’s power to ensure timely and comprehensive 
reform. 
Indeed, many courts are still wedded to the past. For example, while 
the court in Abidor dismissed the association plaintiffs’ complaints on 
standing grounds, it made clear that, had it reached the merits, it would 
have ruled that the search was perfectly valid.72 This suggests that at least 
some courts are unwilling to meet the new challenges of the digital age. 
Standing is also a significant barrier. A plaintiff must have a particular 
and personal injury—that occurred in the past—to be deemed to have 
standing sufficient to support a cause of action in court. Second, under the 
declaratory judgment banner, a plaintiff must be able to proffer a particular 
case or controversy before a court will take the case. Thus, organizations 
such as the NACDL and the NSSA will not likely have recourse in court to 
try to head off future disaster at the pass. 
A lack of time and resources also make the courts ill-suited to answer 
these questions. In fact, the United States Supreme Court hears a fraction 
(often less than one percent) of the cases petitioned to it for certiorari.73 
 
72
  Abidor, 2013 WL 6912654, at *7–14. Although a discussion of standing is beyond the scope of 
this Article, it is worth noting that, as standing is applied to exclude more litigants from constitutional 
discourse, so too will the courts be excluded from efficiently protecting privacy in the digital age. See 
generally Charles E. MacLean, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Doctrine is Rudderless in the Digital Age, Unless Congress Continually Resets the Privacy Bar, 24 ALB. 
L.J. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2014). 
73
  See Kedar S. Bhatia, Likelihood of a Petition Being Granted, DAILYWRIT (Jan. 10, 2013), 
http://dailywrit.com/2013/01/likelihood-of-a-petition-being-granted/ (using Supreme Court data to 
estimate the certiorari petition granted rate at 0.862% for petitions filed between June 30, 2011, and July 
2, 2012). The Court issued formal opinions in fewer than 85 cases per year for each year from 2007-
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Also, a case may take years before appellate review occurs, which means 
that lawyers traveling abroad will continue to face doubt and uncertainty 
regarding the confidentiality of information stored on laptops. Moreover, 
courts simply do not have the time or the resources to engage in an 
extensive policy analysis, or to reflect upon the many issues that are 
presented in this and other digital contexts. They cannot hold hearings, 
appoint a task force, or study the substantial amount of empirical research 
that exists. In other words, courts cannot provide timely—or 
comprehensive—answers to the complex questions that arise as technology 
advances at a far more rapid pace. 
The solution must come from Congress. Congress and state legislatures 
need not await particular cases or controversies or be constrained by stare 
decisis, to create meaningful—and politically viable—solutions (indeed, 
legislative acts are prospective and contemplate practical solutions to past, 
current, and future problems). These bodies are not limited to one issue or 
set of facts at a time, can broadly legislate across whole spheres of activity 
and, at least when acting functionally, can enact a great deal of legislation 
during every session. 
Thus, it will be Congress’s responsibility to carefully consider, reflect 
upon, and weigh the competing interests in privacy and crime prevention. 
The outcome should, in our view, result in a modern conception of privacy 
to match modern technology. Thus, Congress and state legislatures may 
well be the proper guardians of privacy in the digital age. For example, 
given the recent fallout from the NSA scandal, Congress can likely muster 
the votes to enact legislation requiring all future digital searches at the 
border to be conducted only upon a showing of reasonable suspicion.74 And 
the authors call upon Congress to do just that. President Obama’s recent 
measures to curtail NSA spying will hopefully begin a trend that requires 
the government to answer a few questions before it searches an individual’s 
private text messages or Google search history. 
CONCLUSION 
National security is an interest of the highest order, but privacy is a 
constitutional right worthy of unwavering protection. The government’s 
infringements upon privacy extend far beyond the border, to cell phones, 
for example, where an individual’s location can be tracked. Until Congress 
enacts legislation, or the Supreme Court draws a line, the threats to 
individual liberty will continue to expand, and citizens will be without 
 
2011. U.S. COURTS, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES—CASES ON DOCKET, DISPOSED OF, AND 
REMAINING ON DOCKET AT CONCLUSION OF OCTOBER TERMS, 2007 THROUGH 2011 (2012), available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/A01Sep12.pdf.  
74
  Perhaps Congress could focus its efforts on amending the statute authorizing such border 
searches, 19 U.S.C. § 1467 (2012), and passing enabling legislation to compel the agency to revise the 
rule on point, 19 C.F.R. § 162.6 (1972). 
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recourse. Eventually, the right balance will be struck, but there is no reason 
why it cannot—and should not—be done now. 
 
